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HEDGE FUNDS AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS:  IS THE SEC
TELLING SECRETS?
James B. Robertson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although hedge funds are often perceived as secretive,1 section 13(f) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires many hedge fund managers to
publicly disclose their equity holdings.  As this Note will demonstrate, such a
disclosure requirement could be construed as a taking of private property, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, thus becoming another barrier to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission’s attempts to regulate the hedge fund industry.
The hedge fund industry has experienced significant growth in recent
years.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) reported, in 2004,
that there were approximately 7000 hedge funds operating in the United States,
managing approximately $870 billion in assets.2  In early 2007, the hedge fund
industry had grown into a $1.4 trillion industry.3  The rapid growth of hedge
funds has been coupled with concerns that the hedge fund industry is largely
unregulated.4  Many of these concerns followed the high profile collapse of
Long Term Capital Management5 in 1998 and regained momentum in 2006
when Amaranth Advisors6 lost roughly $6 billion; both of these events have
* J.D. candidate, University of Nevada Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law, 2008;
MBA candidate, University of Nevada Las Vegas, 2008; B.S., University of Colorado, 2003.
1 Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Walk a Hard Line Between Silence and Sharing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at C7.
2 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,055-56 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 & 279) [hereinafter
Adopting Release] (noting that hedge fund assets had grown by 260 percent over the previ-
ous five years and projecting assets under management to reach $1 trillion by the end of
2004).
3 Carter Dougherty, Economic Powers to Study Growing Influence of Hedge Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, § 1, at 21.
4 Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 704
(2000).
5 Long Term Capital Management was a hedge fund founded in 1994.  “[I]n 1998, global
stock and bond markets nearly seized as Long-Term Capital lost a stunning $4 billion in a
matter of months.”  Gregory Zuckerman, Long-Term Capital Chief Acknowledges Flawed
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at C1.
6 Amaranth Advisors, a Connecticut based hedge fund, lost roughly $6 billion in the natural
gas market in September of 2006.  Ann Davis, Regulators Scrutinize Amaranth, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 25, 2006, at C3.
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drawn the investment world’s attention to the federal government’s regulatory
approach to hedge funds.7
In September 2003, the SEC released its much anticipated Staff Report,
titled the “Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds,”8 citing the industry’s
growth and the SEC’s own lack of information on hedge funds as its primary
basis for conducting the Report’s underlying study.9  In October 2004, the SEC
concluded that its current regulatory program for hedge fund advisers was inad-
equate.10  The SEC subsequently moved to increase its regulatory efforts by
proposing a new rule that would require hedge fund advisers, managing at least
$25 million in assets, to register with the SEC so that it could gather informa-
tion about hedge funds, oversee hedge fund advisers, and deter or detect fraud
by unregistered advisers.11
The SEC met strong opposition in its efforts to implement the more strin-
gent hedge fund regulation.12  Among those who opposed the new rule were
two dissenting SEC Commissioners, Alan Greenspan, and numerous represent-
atives from the hedge fund industry.13  Despite the resistance that the SEC
faced at the adoption stage, it promulgated the new regulation, requiring most
hedge fund managers to register with the SEC, as investment advisers, by Feb-
ruary of 2006.14  The new rule would have made the hedge fund industry much
more transparent because registered investment advisers must, among other
requirements, open their record to the SEC upon request.15  However, the new
rule was almost immediately challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia as arbitrary and an invalid exercise of the SEC author-
ity.16  In Goldstein v. SEC, the court agreed and vacated the new hedge fund
rule.17
The hedge fund industry’s resistance to federal regulation became more
apparent when Phillip Goldstein, a hedge fund adviser and the named plaintiff
in Goldstein v. SEC, indicated that he expects to challenge another SEC rule,
section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires all invest-
ment advisers with discretion over $100 million of equity assets to publicly
disclose their holdings.18  Mr. Goldstein has likened this disclosure requirement
to the illegal downloading of music or the theft of Coca Cola’s secret formulas,
positing that his fund’s equity holdings constitute a protected trade secret, and
7 Gretchen Morgenson & Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s Loss Rattles Nerves, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at C1.
8 Adam R. Bolter, Note, Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers:  A Valid Exercise of Rulemak-
ing Authority or the Promulgation of New Law?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 595, 596 (2005).
9 SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, at vii (2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter STAFF REPORT].
10 Adopting Release, supra note 2, at 72,059.
11 Id. at 72,063.
12 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 6 (2005).
13 Id.
14 See Adopting Release, supra note 2, at 72,054.
15 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2000).
16 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
17 Id. at 884.
18 Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, BUS. WK., Sept. 12, 2006, http:// www.business
week.com/investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291.htm?chan=search.
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the required disclosure amounts to a taking of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.19
This Note examines federal regulation of hedge funds as well as the hedge
fund industry’s efforts to avoid federal regulation.  This Note also addresses
whether an investment adviser’s equity holdings are deserving of trade secret
protection and whether the public disclosure mandated by section 13(f) of the
Securities Exchange Act constitutes a taking without just compensation.  To
analyze these questions properly, Part II of this Note provides an overview of
hedge funds and the current regulatory framework imposed on hedge funds and
their advisers.  Part III explores relevant trade secret law and concludes that a
reviewing court would be justified in finding that the equity holdings of hedge
fund advisers are deserving of trade secret protection.  Part IV examines the
ramifications of such a finding, if the requirements imposed by section 13(f)
were challenged as a taking, and Part V provides concluding remarks.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HEDGE FUNDS
A. What Are Hedge Funds?
The term “hedge fund” does not have a uniformly accepted definition, but
it is commonly used to refer to any professionally “managed pool of assets used
to invest and trade in equity securities, fixed-income securities, derivatives,
futures and other financial instruments.”20  Although there is no universal defi-
nition of a hedge fund, the term has largely been defined by what hedge funds
are not and by the regulations to which these asset pools are not subject.21  The
SEC’s 2003 Staff Report defined a “hedge fund as an entity that holds a pool of
securities, whose interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which
is not registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act
of 1940.”22
Remaining exempt from most federal securities regulations allows hedge
funds to engage in very different investing and trading behavior than their
mutual fund counterparts.  For example, the Investment Company Act prohibits
registered investment companies, such as mutual funds, from trading on margin
and engaging in short sales, which are core elements of common hedge fund
trading strategies.23  Registered investment companies are also required to dis-
close their investment positions and financial condition to the SEC.24  Such a
19 Id.
20 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 12, at 1; see also David A. Vaughan, Comments for the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Roundtable on Hedge Funds, Selected Definitions of
“Hedge Fund” (May 14-15, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.
htm  (providing fourteen definitions of the term hedge fund found in government and indus-
try publications).
21 Bolter, supra note 8, at 598.
22 Id. (citing STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 3).  Most hedge funds are exempt from the
Investment Company Act’s requirements because they have 100 or fewer beneficial owners
and do not offer their securities to the public, or because their investors are all qualified high
net-worth individuals or institutions.  The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C
§ 80a-3 (2000).
23 Bolter, supra note 8, at 599.
24 Id. n.17.
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requirement makes remaining unregistered attractive to hedge fund managers,
especially to those that consider their investment positions to be valuable trade
secrets.
B. Organization and Regulation
Most hedge funds are organized as limited partnerships, with each investor
taking the position of a limited partner while the fund’s investment adviser is
typically the general partner.25  Almost all hedge funds compensate their port-
folio managers with a performance fee, based on the returns the manager is able
to generate, and with a periodic fee, calculated as a percentage of the fund’s
assets.26  The asset-based fee is typically calculated at an annual rate of one or
two percent of the fund’s assets, while the performance fee is most often calcu-
lated as twenty percent of earned profits.27  “By contrast, the investment
adviser to a mutual fund expects to be [compensated] regardless of the mutual
fund’s performance.”28
Unlike other investment funds, hedge funds are considerate in their entity
selection, size, and offerings in order to remain exempt from registration with
the SEC, and “as a result are not constrained by the [Investment] Company
Act’s rigid and often obtuse rules [regarding] hedging, leverage and diversifica-
tion . . . .”29  In addition to the implications regarding trading strategies, avoid-
ing registration with the SEC is what permits hedge fund managers to charge a
performance fee for developing successful trading strategies.30
Although unregistered hedge funds are able to utilize more aggressive
investment strategies than mutual funds, they do, like the rest of the investing
world, come within the scope of most federal securities laws,31 most notably
the Securities Act of 1933,32 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,33 the Invest-
25 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.
26 Id. at 2.
27 Id. (noting that “[t]he asset-based fee is generally viewed as needed to cover the man-
ager’s operating overhead [and] [t]he performance . . . fee . . . is intended to . . . align[ ] the
manager’s interests with those of the investors”).
28 Id. n.4.
29 Id. at 2.
30 Id. at 11.
31 Jacob Preiserowicz, Note, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds:  Has the SEC
Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 813 & n.33 (2006).
32 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).  The primary objective of the
Securities Act of 1933 is to provide full and fair disclosure in securities transactions. STAFF
REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.  Under the Securities Act, an entity that offers public securities
must file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  15 U.S.C.
§ 77(f).  Generally ownership interests in hedge funds fall within the definition of the term
“securities” for the purpose of the Securities Act. STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.  How-
ever, most hedge funds rely on a “private placement exemption” rather than file a registra-
tion statement.  Gibson, supra note 4, at 689.  To qualify as a private placement and avoid
registration under the Securities Act, hedge funds rely on a “safe harbor” provision that
permits issuers to sell securities to an unlimited number of “accredited investors” who are
considered able to fend for themselves. STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15.  The term
“accredited investor” includes individuals who have a net worth, or joint worth with a
spouse, above $1 million or have income over $200,000 in the previous two years, and also
includes certain institutional investors with more than $5 million in assets. Id. at 15 (citing
Rule 501 under the Securities Act).
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ment Company Act of 1940,34 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.35  To
an extent, hedge funds are indirectly regulated through the statutory exemptions
contained in these acts, which limit their size and availability to certain
investors.
C. Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Many hedge fund advisers are subject to the quarterly reporting require-
ments of section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act,36 the reporting require-
ment that this Note examines as a possible regulatory taking of property
without just compensation.
Section 13(f) was enacted by Congress in 1975 “to increase the public
availability of information regarding the purchase, sale, and holdings of securi-
ties by institutional investors.”37  Section 13(f) applies to all “institutional
investment manager[s],” including managers of unregistered hedge funds who
exercise investment discretion over accounts with an aggregate fair market
value of at least $100 million.38  More specifically, section 13(f) requires that
any investment adviser that exercises investment discretion over or owns $100
million or more in equity securities must report those holdings to the SEC on
Form 13F.39  In calculating the assets under management, an investment
adviser must include all securities portfolios that he or she exercises investment
33 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn.  This Act covers all facets of
the securities markets and all transactions involving securities trading.  Gibson, supra note 4,
at 691.  Several provisions of the Exchange Act either apply directly to hedge funds or
indirectly shape hedge funds through exemptions.  For example, section 12(g) and Rule 12g-
1 of the Exchange Act require that a securities issuer, which includes hedge funds, that has
500 holders of a class of equity security and assets in excess of $10 million must register the
equity security.  17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2007).  Thus hedge funds can avoid registration
under this Act by limiting their number of equity holders to 499 investors. STAFF REPORT,
supra note 9, at 18.
34 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64.  Hedge funds with less
than 100 beneficial owners are exempt from the Investment Company Act. Id. § 80a-
3(c)(1).
35 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.  Under this Act, invest-
ment advisers with fewer than fifteen clients that do not hold themselves out to the public as
investment advisers are exempt from registration under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. Id. § 80b-3(b)(3).  The Commission considers each fund to be one client for the pur-
poses of this rule; thus the Act’s only practical limitation is to limit the number of funds one
person can advise to fifteen or less.  Preiserowicz, supra note 31, at 817.  By not registering
under the Advisers Act, a fund manager is not restricted from charging an incentive fee to
qualified clients, investors with at least $750,000 under management and a net worth of $1.5
million, something that would be prohibited if the fund manager was in fact registered as an
investment adviser. Id. at 817 & n.63 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (2005)).
36 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(a)(1) (2007).
37 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Notice:  Re:  Section 13(f) Confidential
Treatment Requests (June 17, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/
13fpt2.htm.
38 STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 20.
39 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 12, at 282 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 40934 (Jan. 12,
1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 2843 (Jan. 19, 1999), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(b)).  Once an adviser
has discretion over $100 million of equity securities, an initial Form 13F report is due by
February 14 of the following year, and a Form 13F filing is required within forty-five days
after the end of each calendar quarter thereafter. Id.
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discretion over, which can even include portfolios held by the adviser’s family
members.40
Once a Form 13F has been filed, the SEC is required to make it publicly
available, unless the investment adviser applies for, and is granted, confidential
treatment.  However, the SEC rarely grants confidential treatment.41  The SEC
has taken the following position with regard to its obligation to disseminate
Form 13F filings publicly:
The wording and legislative history of [Section 13(f)] make clear Congress’ intent
that Section 13(f) information be promptly disseminated to the public.  Congress also
recognized that, in some instances, disclosure of certain types of information could
have harmful effects, not only on an investment manager, but also on the investors
whose assets are under its management.42
Although an investment adviser, wanting to maintain secrecy as to his or her
equity positions, can apply for confidential treatment, the Division of Invest-
ment Management for the SEC has taken the position that such requests can
only be granted under certain limited circumstances.43
It is the Exchange Act and the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) that
provide the requirements under which the SEC may grant confidential treat-
ment for Form 13F information.44  The SEC has declared that confidential
treatment is available only in those instances in which an investment manager
demonstrates that confidential treatment is in the public’s interest.45  This dec-
laration that confidential treatment is only provided when it is in the public’s
interest raises the question of whether the SEC’s procedures for granting confi-
dential treatment sufficiently protect trade secrets.  Whether an investment
manager’s security holdings actually constitute a trade secret is discussed
below in Part III of this Note.  The following section describes the SEC’s cur-
rent process for granting confidential treatment.
D. Confidential Treatment Under Section 13(f)
In adopting section 13(f), Congress specified two categories of securities
information that, upon request, should be exempt from section 13(f) disclosure:
(1) information that would identify securities held by a natural person or certain
estates or trusts; and, most relevant to this Note, (2) “information that would
reveal an investment manager’s program of acquisition or disposition that is
ongoing both at the end of a reporting period and at the time that the invest-
ment manager’s Form 13F is filed.”46  The justification for exempting this sec-
ond category of information is apparent in the legislative history of section
13(f), which explains that the acquisition or disposition program exemption
exists because “[t]he Committee believes that generally it is in the public inter-
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
43 Id.
44 Id.  Exemption 4 of the FOIA states that “trade secrets and commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential” may be withheld from disclo-
sure.  Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000).
45 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
46 Id.
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est to grant confidential treatment to an ongoing investment strategy of an
investment manager.  Disclosure of such strategy would impede competition
and could cause increased volatility in the market place.”47  While it seems
clear that Congress was concerned with the harms associated with publicly dis-
closing an ongoing investment strategy, the SEC has not been easily convinced
that these harms exist.
The instructions that accompany Form 13F seek information concerning at
least four elements that the SEC considers particularly relevant to its assess-
ment of an application for confidential treatment for a program of ongoing
acquisition or disposition.48  The SEC requires that applications show (1) the
investment manager has a specific program, (2) the program is ongoing, (3) the
disclosure would reveal the manager’s investment strategy, and (4) the disclo-
sure would result in demonstrable harm.49
Institutional investment managers have found that these requirements are
difficult to overcome, and even Warren Buffet, whose investment strategies are
highly coveted, has been denied confidential treatment.50  The third require-
ment of proving that disclosure would reveal the manager’s investment strategy
is perhaps the most significant hurdle.  Under this requirement, an applicant
must demonstrate how the public would be able to discern the manager’s strat-
egy based on public disclosure of his or her purchases or sales of a particular
security.51  What is troubling about this requirement is that, even though a
manager’s specific strategy may not be apparent to the public, his or her strat-
egy can still suffer from the public disclosure of a fund’s holdings.  For exam-
ple, an investment manager may have an ongoing strategy of selling off shares
of a specific security over a year’s time.  Although the public would be una-
ware of the manager’s exact strategy, the investing public may react to the
manager’s disposition of the security once his or her next Form 13F is dis-
closed.  In other words, the manager’s initial sale of the security may act as a
signal to the public that they too should sell the security, triggering a decrease
in its market price.  While the public would be unable to discern the manager’s
true strategy, under these circumstances, the manager would still be harmed as
his or her remaining shares of that security would have lost value, solely as a
result of filing a Form 13F.  Under these circumstances, had the manager
applied for confidential treatment, such a request would most certainly have
been denied.  Here the disclosure would not have enabled the public to discern
the manager’s strategy because the SEC would not have considered this to be a
specific ongoing program of acquisition or disposition.  The SEC has taken the
position that “[m]ere indications, however, that a manager’s overall position in
a security had changed during a quarter are, by themselves, insufficient because
this information would not necessarily indicate that the transaction(s) were
47 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265.  The SEC has
added two additional categories of information that are also eligible for confidential treat-
ment:  “(1) open risk arbitrage positions; and (2) investment strategies that utilize block
positioning.”  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
48 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
49 Id.
50 Buffett to Have More Trouble Hushing Up Holdings, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2003, at 5.
51 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
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made pursuant to a program of acquisition or disposition within the meaning of
Form 13F.”52  The fact that the SEC has been reluctant to grant confidential
treatment requests, in these circumstances and others, has no doubt frustrated
many hedge fund managers and encouraged some to challenge section 13(f) as
a taking of private property.  The remainder of this Note will first examine the
question of whether hedge fund holdings are protected property and will then
examine the question of whether section 13(f) amounts to a taking.
III. DO HEDGE FUNDS HOLD TRADE SECRETS?
“In many ways, the logic for protecting trade secrets parallels that for pro-
tecting patents and copyrights.  People will not develop certain forms of infor-
mation at private cost if the benefits of that information can be immediately
socialized by the unilateral actions of others.”53  However, unlike patents and
copyrights, trade secrets are protected primarily by state law.54  In most states,
a “trade secret” is defined as “any information that can be used in the operation
of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to
afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”55  Under this
broad definition, an argument can certainly be made that a hedge fund adviser’s
equity holdings constitute a trade secret.
A hedge fund adviser’s investment strategy and holdings reveal the infor-
mation used in the operation of the fund.  Although a fund’s investment strat-
egy is based on publicly available information, the fund’s holdings represent
the adviser’s efforts in researching and analyzing publicly available informa-
tion in order to gain an economic advantage over other market participants.
The sufficient value created by these efforts is depicted in the fund’s invest-
ment returns and the performance fee paid to the fund’s adviser.
Likewise, an argument can be made that all investment fund advisers,
including those of mutual funds, possess trade secrets.  However, a trade secret
must, first of all, be a secret.56  Mutual fund advisers are generally required to
register with the SEC as investment advisers, which make them subject to
numerous disclosure obligations under the Advisers Act.  As an example,
Adviser Act Rule 206(4)57 requires registered advisers to disclose their hold-
ings, including the names, dates, and market price of acquired securities, to
prospective investors.  By choosing to register with the SEC and not take
advantage of the numerous exceptions to registration that most hedge funds
utilize, mutual fund managers deliberately elect not to keep their holdings and
investment strategies secret, which allows free access for others to duplicate the
funds’ investments.
On the other hand, hedge fund managers that wish to remain unregistered
must consciously do so by complying with several exemptions provided in fed-
52 Id.
53 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings
Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57 (2004).
54 Id. at 58.
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
56 Ashland Mgmt., Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (N.Y. 1993).
57 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2007).
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eral securities laws.  The secrecy maintained by many unregistered hedge funds
is only thwarted by Rule 13(f) of the Exchange Act once the fund’s adviser has
discretion over $100 million dollars in publicly traded securities.  If a hedge
fund’s assets grow to a value of $100 million or more, the fund’s manager has
no choice but to publicly disclose the holdings, unless the fund is granted confi-
dential treatment.58
Once a fund adviser’s holdings reach $100 million in value, the initial
Form 13F report is not due until February 14 of the following year, and addi-
tional Form 13F filings are not required until forty-five days after the end of
each calendar quarter thereafter.59  Thus, an argument can also be made that the
SEC’s delay in publicly disclosing an adviser’s holdings under 13(f) renders
the information disseminated to the public as stale and worthless, due to the
volatile nature of equity markets.  It may be true that by the time a Form 13F is
publicly disclosed, at least some of the information in the filing is no longer
valuable to a person or entity that wishes to duplicate the investment strategy of
the filer.  However, given the diverse and dynamic nature of investment fund
trading, it would be impractical to fashion and apply a rule to account for and
determine when a fund’s holdings are no longer sufficiently valuable to be con-
sidered a trade secret.  It would also be unjust to say that the very rule that
mandates the public disclosure of a fund’s holdings also renders the informa-
tion made available to the public worthless and no longer deserving of
protection.
The above analysis demonstrates that under the very broad trade secret
definition adopted by most states, it would be appropriate for a court to deter-
mine that a hedge fund’s holdings and investment strategies are in fact trade
secrets, so long as the fund itself maintains secrecy with regard to its holdings
and investment strategies.60
IV. TRADE SECRETS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
The United States Constitution’s Takings Clause, found in the Fifth
Amendment, provides that “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”61  A complete understanding of this clause
requires a court to address four questions:  “(1) Has private property been
taken?  (2) If so, was there some justification for that taking under the police
power?  (3) If not, was the taking for a public use?  And (4) if so, has just
compensation been provided?”62
A. Has Property Been Taken?
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
that trade secrets are property under Missouri law and thus protected by the
58 Whether the confidential treatment available under 13(f) adequately protects trade secrets
is discussed in Part IV of this Note.
59 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 12, at 282.
60 This could include maintaining secrecy even as to accounting practices and not obtaining
full financial audits. Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, supra note 18.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
62 Epstein, supra note 53, at 58.
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Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.63  The Court went on to analyze
whether a taking occurs when the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
requires pesticide manufacturers to disclose their trade secret information.64
The Court analyzed the takings question as a regulatory taking, applying the
Penn Central three-factor test, by examining (1) the character of the govern-
ment action, (2) its economic impact, and (3) its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations.65
No argument was made when the Monsanto Court assumed that the chal-
lenged government program should be evaluated as a regulatory taking.66
However, distinguishing between regulatory takings and physical takings is not
appropriate when dealing with trade secrets, where the per se rule that is
applied in physical occupation cases provides a direct analogy.67  Cases in
which the holder of a trade secret is allowed to continue using the secret him-
self, but is not permitted to exclude others from its use, are also analogous to
partial takings cases, in which the owner of private property is allowed to retain
title to property but is required to provide public access to the property.68  The
principal partial takings case is Kaiser Aetna v. United States.69
In Kaiser Aetna, the Supreme Court held that the government had commit-
ted a physical taking when it required the owner of a private marina to provide
open access to all individuals who had access to public waters.70  The hallmark
of property was said to lie in the right to exclude others, which was compro-
mised when state action turned the private marina into common property.71
Although this was a partial taking, because title to the marina property was
retained, the obligation to compensate the owner was determined under the
virtual per se taking rule that is used in the case of direct government occupa-
tion, which should also apply in the area of trade secret takings.72
The principal distinction between a regulatory takings analysis and a phys-
ical takings analysis is the far lower standard of judicial review applied to regu-
latory takings.73  The judicial review applied to regulatory takings is derived
from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,74 which stands for the
idea that “so long as the regulated user retains some viable economic use of the
property, then he cannot complain of the loss of other sticks in the bundle of
rights.”75  An analogy can also be made between restrictions on the use of trade
secrets where, for example, the holder is prevented from using the trade secret
in a certain location but is still the only person permitted to use the secret, and
zoning restrictions that limit a landowner’s use of property but still permit the
63 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
64 Id. at 1004.
65 Id. at 1005 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
66 Epstein, supra note 53, at 65.
67 Id. at 62.
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
70 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
71 Epstein, supra note 53, at 62.
72 Id. at 62-63.
73 Id. at 63.
74 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
75 Epstein, supra note 53, at 63.
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owner to exclude others from the property.76  However, regulations that require
a trade secret owner to disclose information for public use are the intangible
equivalent of state action that amounts to direct occupation of private prop-
erty.77  In other words, regulations that require a trade secret owner to turn over
information for public disclosure are the intangible equivalent of Kaiser Aetna,
where the government mandated that the owner of a marina allow public
access.78  As such, it would be appropriate for a court to apply a per se takings
analysis to a section 13(f) challenge, just as the Supreme Court did in Kaiser
Aetna.  However, because the precedent set by Monsanto provides that trade
secret takings fall under a regulatory takings analysis, this Note will proceed
under Monsanto and its use of the Penn Central three-factor test as applied to
trade secret takings.
B. Section 13(f) as a Regulatory Taking Under Penn Central
1. The Character of the Government Action
The stated justification for implementing section 13(f) is “to increase the
public availability of information regarding the purchase, sale, and holdings of
securities by institutional investors.”79  By admittedly making a hedge fund’s
holdings available to the public, such a disclosure requirement is intended to
create a public use.  The current judicial approach to takings claims reasons that
if there is any conceivable public benefit from a government action, it should
not be enjoined and compensation should not be paid to the property owner.80
Admittedly, there is a conceivable public benefit from requiring disclosure of
institutional investment information to the public.  A hedge fund’s investors
can benefit directly by using the disclosure as a third party check on the infor-
mation passed from the fund’s manager to its investors.  However, the disclo-
sure requirement also indirectly benefits any other person or entity that wants to
duplicate a successful fund’s trading strategies.  This indirect benefit should be
accounted for in evaluating the character of section 13(f), as it renders a suc-
cessful investment manager’s efforts and trade secrets less valuable if any and
all other fund managers can attract investors and earn a performance fee by
mimicking another fund’s strategies.
The government’s justification for section 13(f), informing investors,
should be questioned in light of the reality that if hedge fund investors wanted
this information they would require it from the funds in which they invest, or
they would only invest in funds that agree to provide them with the same infor-
mation.  Thus, the justification for section 13(f) can essentially be carried out
through each fund’s internal policies.  It would be unreasonable to assume that
accredited investors, who are expected to be knowledgeable and sophisticated
investors, would trust a fund that does not provide its members with the infor-
76 Id. at 64.
77 Id.
78 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1979).
79 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
80 Epstein, supra note 53, at 64-65 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-
41 (1984)); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488-90 (2005) (holding that
a local government’s seizure of homes, business, and churches for private economic devel-
opment qualified as a “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ210.txt unknown Seq: 12  1-APR-08 13:28
798 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:787
mation that they desire.  Furthermore, the SEC could still protect the investing
public by requiring fund managers to file Form 13F and also protect the trade
secrets held by fund managers by keeping all 13F filings confidential.
By providing the public with the ability to copy a fund manager’s invest-
ments, section 13(f) arguably has a negative impact on the entire hedge fund
market.  Hedge fund advisers challenging 13(f) would certainly argue that dis-
closure, and the loss of the right to exclude others from using their trade
secrets, renders those trade secrets worthless and likewise makes their efforts
worthless.  The value of the fund managers’ efforts and the fees they can earn
for their skills and services are likely to be diminished by the disclosure of their
holdings.  As a result, successful fund managers no longer have the incentive to
develop unique and innovative trading strategies, just as artists or inventors
would be discouraged from bringing new ideas to the market if there were no
legal protection available for their intellectual property.
2. The Government Action’s Economic Impact
Unfortunately for any fund manager seeking to challenge section 13(f) as
a taking of his or her property, the Penn Central standard requires that “so long
as the regulated [property owner] retains some viable economic use of the prop-
erty in question, . . . he cannot complain of the loss of other sticks in the bundle
of rights.”81  Although 13(f) requires a hedge fund manager to disclose trade
secrets, that manager still earns a performance fee by putting the trade secrets
to use.  The fund manager still has the right to continue using his or her trade
secrets, and thus retains some economic use for his or her trade secrets, even
though the fund manager’s performance fees are likely to be diminished in the
future as a result of filing a Form 13F.  Thus under the Penn Central standard,
it is difficult to argue that section 13(f) constitutes a taking, given that fund
managers retain some viable economic use of their trade secrets.
3. Interference with a Reasonable Investment Backed Expectation
The Court’s opinion in Monsanto was almost entirely dedicated to the
third Penn Central factor:  a reasonable investment backed expectation, which
must be more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract need.82  The Mon-
santo Court found that the plaintiff, a pesticide manufacturer, could not have
had a reasonable investment backed expectation.  The Court explained that the
plaintiff could not have expected the EPA to keep the submitted data confiden-
tial beyond the limits of the statute in effect at that time, adding that the plain-
tiff was on notice that the EPA was authorized to publicly disclose any data it
received at any time, as the statute prescribed.83  Under this reasoning, a court
could easily find that hedge fund advisers are on notice that their trade secrets
will be disclosed if their securities reach a value of $100 million, as is pre-
scribed in the language of section 13(f).  However, the confidential treatment
available under section 13(f), discussed above, does provide a basis for hedge
81 Epstein, supra note 53, at 63.
82 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008-10 (1984).
83 Id. at 1008.
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fund managers to possess a reasonable investment backed expectation, if the
SEC were to agree that hedge funds possess trade secrets.
In Monsanto, the Supreme Court also evaluated a six-year period where
the statutory scheme in effect gave the submitter the opportunity to protect its
trade secrets from disclosure by designating them as trade secrets at the time of
submission.84  The Court reasoned that during this period the plaintiff provided
data to the EPA with the understanding that its trade secrets were protected,
adding that the statute gave explicit assurance that the EPA was prohibited
from disclosing publicly any data submitted, if both the submitter and the EPA
determined the data to constitute a trade secret.85
Similarly, the language of section 13(f) authorizes confidential treatment,
under the FOIA, when such treatment is in the public’s interest.  Exemption 4
of the FOIA protects the owner of trade secrets from mandated public disclo-
sure.86  The Monsanto Court’s reasoning can be directly applied to the section
13(f) allowance for confidential treatment.  It would be reasonable for a fund
manager to expect confidentiality as to his or her trade secrets, based on the
confidential treatment provision of section 13(f).
C. Is There Justification for the Taking?
Section 13(f) is intended “to increase the public availability of information
regarding the purchase, sale, and holdings of securities by institutional inves-
tors.”87  As discussed above, Congress may have a valid justification for pro-
tecting hedge fund investors, but publicly disclosing a Form 13F filing is
susceptible to judicial scrutiny.
So long as a statute’s stated objective can be met without compromising
the content of the trade secret, the statute must provide means that satisfy the
dual imperatives of protecting private property and the stated objective.88  Pub-
licly disclosing a fund’s security holdings arguably causes more harm to the
one whose efforts generated the information than the resulting benefit the pub-
lic gains from such disclosures.  In addition, the SEC can gather the Form 13F
information without making it publicly available, which would protect the
fund’s trade secrets, the investors of that fund, and the public if any fraudulent
activity was ever detected.
Not only is the justification for section 13(f) weak, but the $100 million
threshold within the rule is somewhat arbitrary.  Why is a hedge fund manager
with $100 million in equity securities under management subject to public dis-
closure, while a manager with $99 million in equities is not?  In fact, this $100
million threshold has not been adjusted for inflation since the rule’s adoption
thirty-five years ago, while today’s hedge funds have been known to lose up to
$6 billion in a matter of days.89
84 Id. at 1010.
85 Id. at 1011.
86 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000).
87 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 37.
88 Epstein, supra note 53, at 66.
89 See Ann Davis et al., Amid Amaranth’s Crisis, Other Players Profited, WALL ST. J., Jan.
30, 2007, at A1.
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D. Has Just Compensation Been Provided for the Taking?
Assuming a court finds that hedge fund holdings amount to trade secrets
and that the disclosure required by 13(f) amounts to a taking, the next questions
to be addressed are whether just compensation has been provided and how is
just compensation to be measured.
In Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger,90 a First Circuit case, a cigarette
manufacturer challenged a Massachusetts ingredient-reporting statute that
required brand-by-brand reporting of tobacco additives and permitted public
disclosure of the ingredient information.  There, the Court specifically rejected
the State’s claim that compliance with the disclosure requirement was compen-
sated through an exchange because permitting tobacco companies to continue
doing business in the State was granted in return for compliance.91  Similarly,
permitting hedge funds to participate in interstate commerce and invest in pub-
licly traded securities does not compensate for an unconstitutional taking of
property rights.  The reasoning behind the State’s argument in Phillip Morris is
no different than “telling the tobacco companies that if they wish to sell their
products within the state of Massachusetts, they must deed over to the state the
title to their Boston headquarters.”92  The same reasoning can be found in
13(f); if a hedge fund manager wishes to develop and use profitable trading
strategies, that manager must share his or her strategies with the public.
Because a hedge fund’s investment returns and performance fees provide a
monetary measure of the value created by a fund’s trade secrets, a court could
easily fashion a standard, based on these numbers, for establishing just com-
pensation.  Of course, this remedy becomes irrelevant if the SEC determines
that the cost of paying just compensation is not worth the benefits gained from
mandating section 13(f) disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Securities and Exchange Commission pushes for increased regula-
tion of hedge funds, it appears that hedge funds and their advisers will continue
to push back and find means to avoid regulation.  The next attempt to elude the
reach of the Securities and Exchange Commission may find its basis in intellec-
tual property law and the protection afforded by the Constitution’s Takings
Clause.  Given the broad definition of trade secrets adopted by most states, a
hedge fund’s holdings could be found to constitute trade secrets.
Such a holding could find a court faced with the question of whether sec-
tion 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act constitutes a taking of private prop-
erty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  A viable argument could be made
that the judicial framework for evaluating takings claims is artificially and
inappropriately blurred by distinguishing between regulatory takings and physi-
cal takings.  An argument can also be made that the proper standard for evalu-
ating takings claims in the case of trade secrets should be the same standard of
90 Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998).
91 Id. at 679.
92 Epstein, supra note 53, at 70.
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review applied to partial physical takings, and, under that standard, section
13(f) works to take a protected property interest without just compensation.
To avoid litigating this matter, the SEC could concede that certain hedge
fund advisers do possess trade secrets and grant them confidential treatment, as
provided for in section 13(f).  Section 13(f) could also be amended to exclude
hedge funds, not from the 13F filing requirement, but from the mandatory pub-
lic disclosure requirement that may in fact constitute a taking.
